Episode 60: Reusing addresses and the Hertzbleed attack
Ep. 60

Episode 60: Reusing addresses and the Hertzbleed attack

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Episode description

In this episode of Bitcoin, Explained, hosts Aaron van Wirdum and Sjors Provoost discuss reusing Bitcoin addresses. More specifically, they explain why reusing Bitcoin addresses is a bad idea.

Reusing Bitcoin addresses is a bad idea for roughly three reasons. The first two of these are that it harms privacy and impedes on the censorship resistance of Bitcoin. In the episode, Aaron and Sjors go over a couple examples of how such a loss of privacy and censorship resistance can negatively affect Bitcoin users.

The third reason that reusing Bitcoin addresses is a bad idea, is that it opens up the possibility of some niche attacks. In certain cases, attackers could extract private keys from signatures after coins are first spent from an address — though this does require that a wallet implemented the signing algorithm wrongly in the first place. There are also some scenarios where quantum computers could in the future extract private keys from signatures if addresses are reused.

Another type of niche attack is a timing sidechannel attack, such as the recently disclosed Hertzbleed Attack. Sjors explains that attackers can potentially derive a private key from a wallet by closely monitoring how the computer that hosts the wallet behaves when signing a transaction. This attack is more plausible if addresses are reused.

Address reuse wiki: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Address_reuse#Security Hertzbleed attack: **

Chapters

00:00:00 Bitcoin Amsterdam and address reuse
00:01:31 What reusing a Bitcoin address means
00:05:04 Privacy risks: savings, income and exchange deposits
00:08:29 Address blacklisting and censorship resistance
00:09:08 Security risks from reused signature nonces
00:13:57 Quantum computers and exposed public keys
00:16:42 Preparing Bitcoin for quantum computing
00:21:54 Hertzbleed and timing side-channel attacks
00:29:00 Practical risks and Bitcoin address terminology

Transcript

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0:20

Aaron van Wirdum Live from Utrecht, this is Bitcoin.

0:23

Sjors Provoost Explained.

0:24

Aaron van Wirdum Hey, Sjors.

0:25

Sjors Provoost What's up?

0:26

Aaron van Wirdum Did you see the amazing announcement that Bitcoin Magazine made this week? The conference is coming to Amsterdam.

0:34

Sjors Provoost I heard.

0:35

Aaron van Wirdum Around the corner.

0:36

Sjors Provoost Exciting.

0:37

Aaron van Wirdum It's about half an hour from Utrecht.

0:39

Sjors Provoost Yeah, no, it's pretty close.

0:41

Aaron van Wirdum Can we expect you there?

0:43

Sjors Provoost Maybe.

0:44

Aaron van Wirdum We'll see. I'll be there. I'll be there for sure. Sjors, we're going to talk about... We're going to talk about address reuse. So this is not really a new topic. It's not something we haven't discussed at least sort of tangentially before. For example, two episodes ago, Ruben was here to talk about his proposal for, what was it called again? Stealth addresses, privacy addresses, dark addresses.

1:14

Sjors Provoost Silent payments.

1:15

Aaron van Wirdum Silent payments. There you go. Thank you. Um, so yeah but we never really tackled the concept of address reuse in itself and there is sort of a newsworthy reason for us to do this this week but we'll get to that in a bit, right?

1:30

Sjors Provoost That's right.

1:31

Aaron van Wirdum So before we start address reuse it's something that's discouraged in Bitcoin. Sjors, what does it actually mean when you're reusing addresses? And I'm specifically asking about what does this mean sort of under the hood? Because we've discussed addresses before and addresses aren't actually a thing in the Bitcoin blockchain, right? So what does it mean if you're reusing addresses?

1:58

Sjors Provoost Right, because an address is something you give to a wallet. It's not something that actually exists on the blockchain. An address is an instruction essentially to the wallet of the payer that says this is how you need to send me coins. And usually what the address will contain is a public key or a hash of a public key. And then as a sender, you will put that on the blockchain so the money actually goes to either a public key or the hash of the public key. And so what does that mean for address reuse? It just basically means that you're making multiple transactions where you're sending coins to the same public key or the same hash of the public key.

2:40

Aaron van Wirdum And is this immediately clear when you are sending the money? Is it clear that it's being sent to the same quote unquote address? Or is it only clear when you're sending money from that address again?

2:52

Sjors Provoost No, it's immediately clear. So you can see on the blockchain for each transaction what the destination is of that transaction. So you can see that it was sent. Yeah, you can see that the destination has been used before if you keep an eye on what's on the blockchain.

3:06

Aaron van Wirdum Right, exactly. So this is, you sometimes see, a very common example of this would be like donation addresses, where someone just posts an address on a website for donations. And then because of that, you can track exactly how much donations someone is getting, right? That's sort of the classic example. But there are more examples. There are, or at least a couple of years ago, there were bad wallets, or at least I would consider them bad wallets that wouldn't generate new addresses automatically. I think these days that's mostly resolved.

3:39

Sjors Provoost Yeah, I mean, there was a trade-off in the beginning, because before we had this thing called hierarchical deterministic wallets. So right now you write down these 12 words, and these 12 words can generate an infinite number of addresses, or not actually infinite, but quite a lot. But before that, it was the case that every address was generated using a unique, randomly generated private key. And so in the beginning, you might create a wallet and it might start with 100 addresses in it, which means 100 different private keys and you would have to back those up. So that's already a challenge because you can't write that down. It's too much information. So you'd maybe put it on a USB stick. But then if you've used up all the 100 addresses and you create address number 101 and you forget to make a backup of that, you just don't have a backup of any coins that go to the last address. So there was a trade-off between backups and privacy in the beginning. And that's one of the reasons probably why not all wallets created fresh addresses.

4:36

Aaron van Wirdum Right. And now that's resolved. Now wallets just use deterministic addresses.

4:42

Sjors Provoost Yep.

4:42

Aaron van Wirdum And you only need one backup. Okay, so...

4:46

Sjors Provoost So there's still plenty of places, especially exchanges, have a habit of giving you an address where you get the same address every time.

4:53

Aaron van Wirdum Yeah. I mean, there's, you know, once in a while still run into like a web shop that will not generate a new address or there are more examples.

5:04

Sjors Provoost Yeah.

5:05

Aaron van Wirdum Okay. So then the next question, I think there are, why is this a problem? And I'd say we can easily categorize this in sort of two or three categories. One category is privacy and then arguably another category is censorship resistance. There's a good Bitcoin wiki page about address reuse, which sort of lists these problems and examples, but we'll go over it in this podcast as well. I'm not going to read out loud the whole URL, but if you just Google address reuse Bitcoin wiki, you'll find the page. So yeah, privacy censorship resistance. And this wiki gives three pretty good examples of why privacy is a problem. So let's run through this real fast. So one problem if you're reusing addresses and how it harms your privacy is that it reveals your savings. So, you know, if someone pays you, then that person can, for example, easily see how much money is on that address. And, you know, they might start talking to people about this. And before you know it, your kids are kidnapped and they know exactly how much ransom to demand. Right. That's one example. Another example is exchange front running. It's another example that's on the wiki. So you're not generating a new address on your exchange and that address is known to belong to that exchange for blockchain analysis. And then one day you're sending a lot of money to that exchange. So people can see that and people figure you're going to sell a lot of Bitcoin and people might want to front run your sale by... selling their first their Bitcoin first and buying it back cheaper by the time your money finally arrives at the exchange.

6:55

Sjors Provoost Yeah.

6:55

Aaron van Wirdum Oh, yeah. The first example—the third example is so let's say you're being paid your salary on your known address and then one day you get a pay rise. Your landlord might be able to see that and decide it's time to charge a little bit more rent since you can clearly afford that.

7:16

Sjors Provoost Right. So basically it's similar to the first example. And the first one was mostly about seeing how much savings somebody has. And the other one is how much income somebody has. It's the same kind of problem.

7:24

Aaron van Wirdum Yeah. So these are just some examples of why it's bad if you don't have any financial privacy. A fourth example. So the censorship resistant example is… Let's say you have...

7:37

Sjors Provoost Maybe we can stick to the first three first. So I think one comment there is that reusing addresses helps with these issues. It does not completely remove them. Because, for example, with the savings, you might use a new address every time, but if all your savings are on the first address, maybe people can still link it to you. So it's a mitigation. It helps to use multiple addresses, but it doesn't completely perfectly solve these privacy issues.

8:03

Aaron van Wirdum Yeah, that's definitely true. I would say address reuse is like a bare minimum. That's the very least you should do to protect your privacy. And then there's a lot more you can do after that. But if you're not even reusing, if you're not even, if you're reusing addresses, then there's literally no privacy whatsoever. That's the least you can do. Okay, then there's the censorship resistant argument, which is if you're, let's say you have some kind of political cause and you're receiving donations on an address, then someone might want to send you some Bitcoin from an exchange, but that exchange doesn't like your political cause, so they refuse to send the payments. That's another example that's easily resolved to generate new addresses.

8:56

Sjors Provoost This goes to address blacklisting in any kind of form, right? Somebody might be ordering miners to block specific addresses. And yeah, reusing addresses makes that whole cat and mouse game significantly more difficult.

9:08

Aaron van Wirdum Okay, so that's privacy and censorship resistance. And then I think the third bucket of problems is maybe a little bit more interesting. And that's sort of where you were gearing this episode towards. That's security.

9:22

Sjors Provoost Yep.

9:23

Aaron van Wirdum So sure, reusing addresses is kind of bad for security as well, right?

9:32

Sjors Provoost Well, reusing addresses, there are certain security vulnerabilities or potential vulnerabilities that will get a lot worse when you're using addresses.

9:42

Aaron van Wirdum Right.

9:43

Sjors Provoost So it's not that the reusing of addresses is necessarily super insecure. But yeah, there are definitely some attacks that you can think of and that have actually happened that would not happen if you happen to change your addresses.

9:55

Aaron van Wirdum Right. So what are these? What are the attacks that are possible if you're reusing addresses?

10:00

Sjors Provoost Yeah. So the one that's mentioned in the wiki is something called the same K value in multiple signatures. But basically what that means is that if you have a private key... And you create a signature with it. And that signature contains another piece of data, which should be a randomly generated number. And as long as that randomly generated number is really random, then you can use the same private key twice and you can sign different messages. Because every transaction is essentially a message.

10:33

Aaron van Wirdum Right.

10:34

Sjors Provoost So when you're spending money from an address once... You're signing a message using that private key if you're spending money again from that same address because there's another coin, perhaps, that was sent to the same address. You're signing another message with the same private key. And as long as you're doing the random number generation correctly, that's all fine. There's no problem. But if there's something wrong in that mechanism and you are not generating a random number, but, for example, you are using the number 0000, if you do that twice, now everybody can steal your money, because they can know your private key. That's just a cryptographic property. And so the main protection against that is to make sure your wallet doesn't make that mistake, by far. But if your wallet made that mistake, but it was not reusing addresses, then you're still okay.

11:24

Aaron van Wirdum Is that really right? Is what you said really right? If you don't use a random address, people can just pick your signature from... No, they can pick your private key from your signature? That doesn't sound right to me.

11:36

Sjors Provoost If you sign two different messages, so two different transactions using the same private key, and you're doing something really, really, really wrong during the signing, namely not generating the right random number, yeah, then people can steal your money. And that's actually the mechanism that's used by one episode that we talked about, the Discreet Log contracts. One of the mechanisms to do the Discreet Log contract is that somebody, like the Oracle says, I'm either going to sign yes or I'm going to sign no. And if they sign both, you can steal the money. And so in that case, it's by design that you can steal the money by that mistake.

12:17

Aaron van Wirdum Oh, yeah.

12:18

Sjors Provoost But wallets can make that mistake accidentally, and they have in the past. Now, there are ways to prevent that that don't even require random data. It's called the pseudo random data. So you generate a random number, but you use the transaction itself to generate the random number. And because no two transactions are identical, it's always going to be a different number.

12:38

Aaron van Wirdum So this is a different problem because one of the problems that I've heard about address reuse and being able to steal...

12:48

Sjors Provoost But I would say it's not really about address reuse, right? It helps. But in this case, this particular example that I just mentioned could also happen with RBF if your wallet made that mistake. Because RBF, you would make one transaction with one satoshi per byte using the private key. And then you'd make another transaction that bumps the fee to two satoshi per byte. You'd be using the same private key twice. And if your wallet made that particular mistake, you would lose your money during the fee bump.

13:13

Aaron van Wirdum So what I was getting at, I thought it was only possible if there were quantum computers.

13:20

Sjors Provoost Nope.

13:20

Aaron van Wirdum So if there were quantum computers tomorrow, then they would be able to extract private keys from signatures. But you're saying this is already possible if there's no random data included in the signature?

13:35

Sjors Provoost Yeah, so the signature, indeed, consists of, yeah. Yeah, that mistake was already there. It's been exploited in the wild. There were wallets that made that mistake and coins were stolen. And there's probably still people out there scanning the blockchain for people making that mistake and then very quickly stealing the money. It's very different from quantum attacks. We can talk about those though.

13:58

Aaron van Wirdum I mean, I brought it up, so yeah. What about them? Is what I just described correct?

14:03

Sjors Provoost It's not so much from signatures. So what happens with quantum, at least the idea of quantum computers in theory one day, is that if there's a public key on the blockchain, visible, then the quantum computer can find the corresponding private key. And that means that that's not a problem if that public key is never used again. Hence the suggestion to reuse addresses. Right,

14:28

Aaron van Wirdum Because the public key is only revealed when money is spent.

14:32

Sjors Provoost Yes, at least until Taproot it was. So when this discussion was very big, what transactions were doing generally is sending money not to a public key, but to the hash of the public key, which quantum computers probably cannot deal with, at least not as efficiently. But once you spend it... in order to spend it, you have to reveal the public key. And so that's when the clock starts ticking and the quantum computer could try and steal the money. Now, in a scenario where you don't reuse addresses, there's only a very short period of time, right? It's between the moment you make the transaction and it goes in the mempool and the moment it confirms in a block. That's when the quantum computer could steal the money because it could figure out what the private key is and basically try to fee bump a transaction that goes through themselves.

15:18

Aaron van Wirdum Yeah.

15:19

Sjors Provoost Which of course could then be stolen by other quantum computers. So, you know, it creates a bit of a rat race, but this is the problem. However, well, for various reasons, one being that there's already a lot of coins on the blockchain that have the public key known. With Taproot, you're just spending to a public key.

15:38

Aaron van Wirdum Yeah, the reason there's a lot of coins on the blockchain of which the public key is known is, for example, because a lot of people used xpubs.

15:48

Sjors Provoost Yeah, exactly. And then the question is if that xpub is known by anyone, they know all those public keys. So the wallet providers know it and maybe some government goes after them. There's all sorts of reasons. But the point is there's so many coins out there for which the public key is known that if it gets stolen by a quantum computer, it would just crash the market. However, what's important to note there is the quantum computer would have longer, right? Because if the public key is already known, then you can just start trying to brute force it and take as much time as you need. Versus the example where we talked about before when you only have a few minutes to do that. And of course, we know the first coins that were mined, in the very beginning when coins were mined, they were not sent to a hash at a public key, they were sent to a public key. So that's already quite a lot of coins. So that's what the quantum computer does. It has nothing to do with signatures though. It has to do with spending.

16:42

Aaron van Wirdum Yeah, I know. I know we're taking a bit of a detour, but while we are on this detour, do you think, and a lot of people do, like this is a question I get very often, like is quantum computer, is the potential of quantum computer someone we should start worrying about, should start thinking about, like to what extent, where's your mind on this point?

17:04

Sjors Provoost Well, I think it's good to think about it, but I don't have the productive capacity to think about it because I don't understand cryptography, let alone quantum cryptography to enough of a degree that I could come up with a new way to deal with it. So I try to listen to the few people who do keep an eye on that. And it's not that many. It's like two or three. And as soon as they say, hey, look at this possibility, then maybe I'll say, okay, let's have a look at that. But from what I've heard, for example, from Peter Wuille, sipa, and some others said, like, there are some mechanisms out there that would be safe against quantum computers. However, they would make transactions really, really large. I don't know like 10 kilobytes some like crazy transaction size and they would be very hard on on blockchain validation so they would just increase the amount of CPU that's needed. And also they don't have many of the nice properties that [unclear] has. So, you know, all these things we talked about that make Taproot so great, signature aggregation, you know, the ability to combine signatures and to do cool stuff like the discrete log context we talked about, all that stuff. The question is whether you can still do that with quantum secure algorithms, and I'm not sure if that's true. So this is a case where the longer you wait, the more people come up with better methodologies. And perhaps also the easier it is to do whatever block size increase is necessary to even fit the stuff, you know?

18:34

Aaron van Wirdum Right.

18:35

Sjors Provoost And the other side of it is like, how long is this going to take? And that could be, you know, tens of years or millions of years. I have no idea. There's a lot of hype about quantum computers, which is, you know, a lot of it is actually just hype. But there are people working on it.

18:54

Aaron van Wirdum Right.

18:54

Sjors Provoost And, you know, there's one optimistic prediction I think I've heard from Stephen Wolfram, known from Wolfram Alpha. And I believe his take, one of his theories, and he's not sure about that, so we can't really count on that, is that the whole idea of speeding things up with quantum computers is like a mirage in the sense that theoretically it should be faster. And you can see that, that it's faster. But in order to actually get the measurement out of the quantum computer to actually use that information, every second you've gained basically on the way in, you're going to lose on the way out. So the idea there would be like, you're not actually going to speed up because it's going to get more and more slow to actually measure it. But that's not proven. And so we can't count on it. We can't say, well, maybe it's not going to happen. So let's just ignore the problem.

19:43

Aaron van Wirdum Right. Okay, that was a big detour.

19:46

Sjors Provoost So how this relates to address reuse, it used to. In the case of where you would use the hash, then address reuse would be nice because then your exposure to the quantum computer is only a few minutes.

19:58

Aaron van Wirdum Well, not reusing addresses would be nice, is what you mean.

20:01

Sjors Provoost Exactly. If you don't reuse addresses, then your exposure to the quantum computer is only a few minutes in the case where you use hashes instead of public keys. And that's, of course, a fallback we could always go back to, I guess. If there is really a quantum computer, you could say, oh, this is not good. We're seeing Satoshi's coins getting stolen. Well, I guess that's great for whoever steals them. Probably not so good for the price. But hey, if you want to protect your coins, you may want to use the hash of a public key for now.

20:27

Aaron van Wirdum I mean, we wouldn't know that they're being stolen even, right? Like, they're just being spent.

20:33

Sjors Provoost Yeah, but the fact that they are suddenly getting spent... very slowly, perhaps, maybe at an exponentially increasing pace, because the first quantum computer might take a year to break the first public key of the first block, maybe the Genesis block, and then maybe the second quantum computer takes six months to do it, and so the second block gets spent, and then it goes faster and faster and faster and faster. But at some point, people want to brag about it, right?

21:03

Aaron van Wirdum I mean, it depends how much money you can earn by keeping your mouth shut, maybe.

21:08

Sjors Provoost Yeah, not that much probably in the beginning. Because if you're stealing, like it takes you a year to steal 50 Bitcoin from the first block and that's worth what?

21:19

Aaron van Wirdum A million bucks?

21:21

Sjors Provoost No, it's a hundred thousand right now, isn't it?

21:24

Aaron van Wirdum 50 is like [unclear] hundred bucks.

21:25

Sjors Provoost Yeah, it's a million.

21:26

Aaron van Wirdum Sorry, did I say a hundred bucks?

21:27

Sjors Provoost No, yeah, you're right.

21:28

Aaron van Wirdum I said a million bucks, right?

21:29

Sjors Provoost Yeah, you said it right.

21:30

Aaron van Wirdum Yeah.

21:31

Sjors Provoost So, okay, great. That's, you know, it's a nice amount of money. You can buy lots of Frappuccinos, but you probably spend a couple billion on your quantum computer. So it doesn't really, it doesn't really justify spending that much money on it. And that depends on how fast it is. If from day one, it's super fast and you can steal all the Bitcoin, then it might be worth doing and worth giving you the secret.

21:54

Aaron van Wirdum Sure, I think it's time to end this detour and get back to the main topic of address reuse and the final topic, the final category. Well, still the category of security. And then this is sort of the reason we're talking about all of this is that we found this on the Bitcoin Optech newsletter. There was recently a new... vulnerability found called the— referred to as the Hertzbleed attack.

22:23

Sjors Provoost Yep.

22:23

Aaron van Wirdum And this could affect Bitcoin and especially address reuse is that right?

22:29

Sjors Provoost Yep.

22:30

Aaron van Wirdum So what is the Hertzbleed attack?

22:32

Sjors Provoost So I don't know in detail but basically hertz is the frequency right so a 50 hertz is like a beeping sound, and so computers or CPUs…

22:42

Aaron van Wirdum So it's a pun. We have a pun in our episode again. Well, it refers to the heartbeat attack, right? I would assume.

22:49

Sjors Provoost Yeah, so the pun is quite indirect because the word hertz is the word for frequency, right? But it's named after a guy named Hertz who happened to be a researcher who came up with this idea. But the last name of that person is actually the Jewish word for heart.

23:07

Aaron van Wirdum Oh, it's even better than I thought.

23:09

Sjors Provoost Yes, it is. But I don't know if it's deliberate. I mean, it sounds the same, but it's one letter difference.

23:14

Aaron van Wirdum I mean, even the logo is sort of similar. Like this is deliberate for sure.

23:18

Sjors Provoost Well, the reference to Hertz is, but in the sense of the frequency, not Herz, which is heart.

23:24

Aaron van Wirdum Right, right, right.

23:25

Sjors Provoost So anyway.

23:26

Aaron van Wirdum Anyways, sure. So what is the Hertzbleed attack?

23:28

Sjors Provoost So I think the general principle is that… is that of a timing side channel attack, which we'll explain in more detail. But basically, I believe it has to do with how CPUs change frequencies depending on what they're doing. But I don't actually know that that well, so I'll just describe the general problem of these side channel attacks and how they relate to address reuse.

23:49

Aaron van Wirdum Okay, yeah.

23:49

Sjors Provoost So the idea is when you're actually making a signature, the act of making a signature involves doing some sort of mathematical operation on the message, so the transaction, and you're doing that mathematical operation using your private key. And so how does that work in practice? Well, your computer looks at your private key and starts, it's 256 bits. It starts at the first bit. That's either a zero or a one. And then it does one calculation if it's a zero and another calculation if it's a one. Essentially, it's kind of like, or you could say it's doing multiplications, for example, or some elliptic curve operation. It does that on every bit. So the problem there is that when you're doing an operation with a zero, your CPU is going to behave slightly different than when you're doing an operation on a one, if you're not careful. So when you're writing a cryptographic library, you want to make sure, and the reason is, well, I'll explain that after. You want to make sure that whatever operation happens after a zero takes exactly the same amount of time and energy and whatever as the operation you would do when there's a one.

24:54

Aaron van Wirdum Right.

24:55

Sjors Provoost Because otherwise somebody's going to listen to your CPU. You know, I'm saying listen quite loosely, but it's like you have a stethoscope and you put it on the CPU and you listen to it and you hear that it's like… And that tells you, okay, so it's, you know, it's reading zeros, it's reading ones.

25:14

Aaron van Wirdum I didn't know you speak computer.

25:16

Sjors Provoost I speak computer. So if you can somehow hear in the widest sense of the word here, that the CPU is processing 256 bits, then you know what the private key is and you can extract it. And so cryptographers make sure that they write the code in a way that you don't hear the difference. But unfortunately, then it turns out all the time there's some problem with, in this case, I guess the CPUs that spoil the result anyway. It's some sort of behavioral change.

25:45

Aaron van Wirdum Yeah, and it's basically like all CPUs, like Intel. Basically, if you have a CPU, you're affected. That's sort of what Hertzbleed page suggests.

25:54

Sjors Provoost Yeah, but the thing is about these type of attacks is you need to get pretty close to somebody's CPU to be able to do it, for one thing. Now, there's two ways to get close to somebody's CPU. One is you can physically visit somebody and put something in their computer. The other is that you're running some program on the computer. So you're running, you basically put some malware on somebody's computer. And this malware could be a JavaScript advertisement on Google sitting somewhere, right, in a browser tab that you're not even paying attention to. And this JavaScript advertisement is very carefully trying to listen to what your computer is doing. It might be, for example, your JavaScript advertisement might be doing a simple calculation itself. And it's measuring how long does this simple calculation take. And one, you know, it finds out, oh, my simple calculation took 10 milliseconds, and then it took 30 milliseconds, and now it took 10 again. Hmm, the CPU must be really busy with something. And then if that something is a nice repeating pattern, then eventually it'll be able to detect it. But that gets to the second problem. It's not a very clear signal. So you probably want to measure like 100 times or 1,000 times to see if you see a repeating pattern. And if you see a repeating pattern of 256 bits, then you can guess, oh, that's probably a private key. Let me give that to my boss and see if they can steal some Bitcoin. So that's where the address reuse gets in, because if you only use the private key once, then you've only got one shot to try and measure it through this indirect method, and you probably won't get a very good signal-to-noise ratio, and so you probably won't be able to write out the key.

27:30

Aaron van Wirdum So if you reuse addresses and therefore reuse signatures, you're more clearly...

27:37

Sjors Provoost Yeah, but even then, this would assume you're reusing the same address hundreds of times a second on the same computer, not over the space of a month.

27:45

Aaron van Wirdum Right.

27:46

Sjors Provoost Or a year, because that malware is not going to be sitting on your... Well, it might be if it's patient, but probably not.

27:54

Aaron van Wirdum Right. So it's a very theoretical attack again, but it's possible.

27:58

Sjors Provoost I would guess so, but I haven't read it in enough detail. It depends on what you're doing. There are keys that are used a lot more often. There, it's a bigger problem.

28:07

Aaron van Wirdum Right.

28:07

Sjors Provoost But yeah, address reuse helps in that sense that every key is only used once.

28:11

Aaron van Wirdum Right. The Bitcoin Optech newsletter does point out that this problem was sort of already known within Bitcoin because this is how some of the hardware wallets were attacked in the past.

28:21

Sjors Provoost Well, this general pattern of this timing has been used against hardware wallets. Yeah, exactly. And there it's a little bit different. So in the case of a hardware wallet, the scenario you might be worried about is some thief gets your hardware wallet physically in their hands. And now they can sign the same message as often as they want. So this is very different from you just casually using your own wallet and you might only use your address once. But if you've got somebody's hardware wallet, you can probably make it do something a million times over and then listen very carefully and you might be able to hear the private key on the wallet and such attacks. So yeah, that's familiar.

29:00

Aaron van Wirdum Okay, well, in conclusion, I would say the biggest problem with address reuse right now by far is still privacy. And then security is sort of theoretical. There are some potential vulnerabilities, but it's really a privacy problem.

29:17

Sjors Provoost Yeah, I mean, when it comes to security, the address reuse itself is not the vulnerability. It is something that can help slightly reduce the impact of the vulnerability.

29:26

Aaron van Wirdum Okay. Yeah, there are some more problems mentioned on the wiki, but I think these are sort of very niche, like barely worth mentioning. Like people might throw away their private key because they assume that they won't be paid on the same address. But then if they are, well, then the money is lost. I guess that's true. But why would you throw away a private key? I don't know. It just seems kind of like grasping at straws for problems.

29:54

Sjors Provoost Well, this is probably more from before the time than the addresses were deterministic. So right now you still have the master key, but you keep getting a new address.

30:06

Aaron van Wirdum There's something else that's mentioned is that it could sort of… it disrupts fee estimation a bit. If you have several outputs on the same address and you want to spend one, then the wallet might not be able to correctly calculate how much it is for some reason.

30:23

Sjors Provoost That does not ring a bell.

30:25

Aaron van Wirdum I didn't really understand that argument either, to be honest, and it seems very niche anyways. And then there was some problem that doesn't even really sound like a problem to me, which is just confusion about terminology. I mean, I guess that's been an argument that we shouldn't even use the word address for Bitcoin addresses because an address like an email address or the address where you live does suggest that it's going to be the same thing that you send stuff to every time.

30:56

Sjors Provoost Yeah.

30:57

Aaron van Wirdum So a better term would be Bitcoin invoice or, you know, someone, a Belcher suggested invoice address and then hopefully after a while people will just forget about the address part. But address is not a great name actually for a Bitcoin address.

31:14

Sjors Provoost Yeah, it sounds like one of those things that will just stick around.

31:17

Aaron van Wirdum Yeah, I don't think we're going to get rid of it at this point.

31:20

Sjors Provoost And also, if you try to change the terminology, that's really just difficult. Generally, it might be easier to just make sure that people understand how things work and eventually they don't worry too much about the terminology.

31:33

Aaron van Wirdum Right. Anyways, yeah, that's our episode, I think, Sjors. I think we made it to the end.

31:40

Sjors Provoost Excellent.

31:41

Aaron van Wirdum I thought this was going to be an episode of like five minutes, but I think we were able to stretch it to, what was it, half an hour maybe in the end?

31:49

Sjors Provoost I don't know. It depends on what the editor makes of it.

31:52

Aaron van Wirdum True.

31:52

Sjors Provoost So I guess thank you for listening to Bitcoin

31:55

Aaron van Wirdum Explained.